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DISPUTES

Calculation of Lease Royalties

In Culpepper v. EOG Resources, Inc., EOG Resources, Inc. was the
successor-in-interest to the lessee's rights under a mineral lease that
required the lessee to pay a royalty on natural gas, calculated at threesixteenths of the "amount realized by [l]essee computed at the mouth
of the well."' EOG produced natural gas and sold it at a location
away from the well. In calculating the royalty it paid to the lessors,
EOG used the "work back" or "net back" method, in which transportation costs incurred by the operator were deducted from the sales
price of the natural gas, with the royalty being paid on the difference.'
The lessors brought suit, arguing that deduction of transportation
costs was improper? The district court agreed and entered judgment
for the lessors, but the Louisiana Second Circuit reversed.' Citing
prior jurisprudence, the appellate court stated that deduction of postproduction costs is proper when calculating a royalty that is based on
the "amount realized . . . at the mouth of the well."'

B.

Commencement of Operations

In Cason v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., Mr. and Mrs. Cason
granted a mineral lease that contained a five-year primary term that
expired on May 31, 2010.6 The lease contained a clause stating that
the lease would remain in effect beyond the primary term for as long
as the lessee was "engaged in operations for drilling."' After multiple
assignments and partial assignments, a portion of the lease was held
by a subsidiary of Chesapeake Operating.8 The lessees did not spud a
well or obtain a drilling permit before the expiration of the primary
term, but prior to the end of the primary term, Chesapeake took steps
in preparation for drilling.' For example, it conducted a survey of a
drill site, staked an area for the well pad, and began to clear trees
from the area.20 Several weeks after the end of the primary term,
Chesapeake spudded a well at the site and eventually completed the
well. 1
1. See Culpepper v. EOG Res., Inc., 92 So. 3d 1142, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
2. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS
TERMS 597-98, 1067-68 (14th ed. 2009) (defining "netback method" and "work-back
valuation method").
3. Culpepper, 92 So. 3d at 1143.
4. Id. at 1142.
5. Id. at 1143.
6. Cason v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 92 So. 3d 436, 438 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 437.
9. Id. at 439.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 438-39.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/14
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But Mr. and Mrs. Cason granted a mineral lease to another company for the same land and filed suit against Chesapeake and several
other defendants that held an interest in the original lease, seeking a
judgment that the original lease had terminated.12 The Casons contended that Chesapeake's activities prior to the expiration of the primary term did not constitute "operations for drilling" and therefore
had not maintained the original lease beyond the primary term. The
district court disagreed and entered judgment for the defendants.
The Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed." The appellate court cited
numerous prior cases in which Louisiana courts have held that spudding a well is not necessary in order for a company to be engaged in
"drilling operations" or for the company to have commenced "drilling
operations." 6 Instead, it is sufficient that a company has begun significant work in preparation for drilling, such as moving lumber and
equipment onsite, building board roads, and staking a site.1 7
The Second Circuit stated that work of the type performed by Chesapeake prior to the expiration of the primary term is sufficient to constitute "operations for drilling" if the work is done in good faith,
without undue delay, and that the work eventually leads to the drilling
and completion of a well."s Whether an operator is in good faith is
judged in large part by its actions, such as whether it diligently works
to complete a well.19 Here, Chesapeake had completed the well without undue delay.2 0 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the district court had not abused its discretion in holding that Chesapeake's
acts of surveying, staking, and clearing were sufficient to constitute
"operations for drilling" and to maintain the lease.
C.

Mineral Code Article 207 Attorney Fees

In Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., Mr. and Mrs. Adams agreed to grant
a mineral lease to JPD Energy. 2 They signed a lease form that provided for a one-eighth royalty, but both the Adamses and JPD later
12. Id. at 438.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 440.
15. Id. at 446.
16. Id. at 442.
17. See id. at 441-42.
18. Id. at 442.
19. See id. at 441.
20. Id. at 443.
21. See id.
22. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 46 So. 3d 751, 752 (La. Ct. App. 2010). Adams involved a dispute regarding the validity of a lease and was decided prior to the
time period covered in this Article. The case is discussed briefly as background for an
attorney's fee dispute involving the same parties, which was decided during the period
covered in this Article. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 87 So. 3d 161 (La. Ct. App.
2012), writ denied, 89 So. 3d 1194 (La. 2012).
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stated that the reference to a one-eighth royalty was erroneous. 23 The
Adamses sued to rescind the lease based on fraud or error, claiming
that the parties had agreed to a one-fourth royalty.2 4 JPD asked the
court to reform the lease, stating that the parties had agreed to a royalty of one-fifth, not one-fourth as claimed by the Adamses.2 s The
district court held that the lease was null and void because the parties
had failed to reach a "meeting of the minds." 6 The Louisiana Second
Circuit affirmed.
After holding that the lease was unenforceable, the trial court
awarded attorney's fees to the Adamses, relying on Mineral Code article 207,28 which authorizes attorney's fees if a lessee fails to timely
acknowledge the "expiration" of a lease. The Second Circuit reversed the attorney's fee award, holding that the nullity of a lease is
not the same as the "expiration" of a lease because a mineral lease
that is declared null is deemed never to have existed.o
II.

UNITS FOR ULTRA DEEP FORMATIONS

Like other states, Louisiana generally applies the rule of capture.'
But, as in some other states, Louisiana law authorizes a regulatory
agency-in Louisiana, it is the Office of Conservation ("Office")-to
enter compulsory unitization orders that modify the rule of capture.3 2
Several statutes grant unitization authority to the Office for various
situations.
For example, Louisiana Revised Statute 30:9 authorizes the Office
to create drilling units and states that "[a] drilling unit, as contemplated [therein], means the maximum area that can be efficiently and
economically drained by one well."33 Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5
authorizes the Office to order pool-wide or field-wide units under certain circumstances, if at least 75% of the royalty owners in the area
23. Adams, 46 So. 3d at 753.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 754.

27. Id. at 756.
28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:207 (2000). This provision under title 31 may be
referred to as article 207 of the Mineral Code. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:1
(2000).
29. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 87 So. 3d 161, 164 (La. Ct. App. 2012), writ
denied, 89 So. 3d 1194 (La. 2012).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907);
Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:8,
31:14 (2000) (codifying the substance of the rule of capture); see also Frey v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 178 (La. 1992) (referring to "rule of capture" by name).
32. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.10(A)
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). In Louisiana, forced pooling and compulsory unitization orders typically are issued simultaneously, and they often are referenced by courts and practitioners simply as "unitization" orders.
33. § 30:9.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/14
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consent to unitization. 34 Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5.1 authorizes
the Office to order pool-wide units, without the need for consent of
75% of the owners in the area, but only if the pool is found at a depth
of at least 15,000 feet.35
Act 743 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature
grants the Office additional unitization authority by enacting a new
section to the existing Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5.1.36 The new
section authorizes the Commissioner of Conservation ("Commissioner") to declare units up to 9,000 acres in size for "ultra deep structures" that are anticipated to be encountered at a minimum depth of
22,000 feet, with such units to be served by one or more unit wells. 3 7
The legislation defines "structure" as "a unique geologic feature that
potentially traps hydrocarbons in one or more pools or zones."3 8
Before entering such an order, the Commissioner must find the following based on evidence presented at a public hearing: the order is
reasonably necessary to prevent waste and the drilling of unnecessary
wells, and to encourage the development of the ultra deep structure;
the operations proposed by the party seeking unitization are economically feasible; sufficient evidence exists to establish the limits of the
ultra deep structure; and the party seeking the unitization has submitted a reasonable development plan that states the number of wells
that the party intends to drill, an estimated schedule for drilling, and
the anticipated depth for each well." Each interested person is entitled to review all the information submitted, including any seismic
data submitted to establish the limits of the ultra deep structure.4 0
III.

RISK FEE

STATUTE

When a compulsory drilling unit is created, the proceeds from oil or
gas produced from a unit well generally will be shared by all persons
holding mineral rights in the unit.4 1 This rule can lead to a problem
when various tracts of land within the unit are subject to mineral
leases held by different lessees. Suppose one lessee-operator is willing to drill a well, but another lessee is unwilling to participate by
paying a share of drilling costs. Absent some provision to address this
issue, there can be one of two results-either the non-participant's
decision leads to a stalemate, and no well is drilled or the operator
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
35. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 30:5 (2007).
§ 30:5.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).

36. The Acts of the Louisiana Legislature may be found at the legislature's website. The URL for that site is http://www.legis.state.1a.us/.
37. § 30:5.1(B) (codifying this new section).
38. Drilling Permits, No. 795, sec. 1, § 28(2), 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 795 (West).
39. Id.
40. § 30:5.1(B)(7).
41. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 30:9 (2007).
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pays all the costs of drilling and thus bears all the risk of a dry hole.
Several states, including Louisiana, address this by Risk Fee Statutes.
Louisiana's Risk Fee Statute 4 2 allows an operator to propose a well
to any other mineral lessees holding leases in the area. The operator
makes the proposal by sending specified information regarding the
proposed well to the other lessees, who have thirty days after receiving the proposal to give a reply stating whether they consent to "participate" in the well.4 If a lessee timely agrees to participate, it
becomes obligated to pay its proportionate share of drilling costs and
will be entitled to its proportionate share of any proceeds from the
well, starting with the first drop of product.4 5 On the other hand, if
the lessee does not timely agree to participate, it will not be liable for
any costs in the event of a dry hole.4 6 The non-participating lessee
retains its right to receive its proportionate share of production from
the proposed well, but it does not begin to share in such production
until the proceeds from production are sufficient to pay for the costs
of drilling and operating the well three times over.4 7
Act 743 amends Louisiana's Risk Fee Statute to require the operator of a unit well to pay certain funds to the non-participating lessee
from the start of production, during the time that a non-participating
lessee would not have been entitled to receive any proceeds under the
pre-Act 743 version of the Risk Fee Statute.4 8 Namely, Act 743 requires the operator to pay the non-participating lessee a portion of the
proceeds of production sufficient to cover any lease royalties or overriding royalties owed by the nonparticipating lessee on the
production. 9

IV.

PRE-ENTRY NOTICE TO SURFACE OWNERS

Louisiana does not recognize mineral estates that create a permanent separation of surface rights and mineral rights, but the state recognizes mineral servitudes.so Mineral servitudes have many of the
characteristics of a mineral estate,5 1 but a mineral servitude generally
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 30:10(A)(2)(a)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.

Sess.).
43. Id. § 30:10(A)(2).
44. Id. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)(ii).
45. Id. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)(i).
46. Id. § 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i).
47. Id. § 30:10(A)(2)(b) (stating that an operator may recover its costs plus a risk
fee equal to twice its costs).
48. Pooling of Oil and Gas Wells, No. 743, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 743 (West)
(amending § 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii)).
49. Id. at sec. 1, § 10(A)(2)(b)(ii) (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii)).

50. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1920); Wempie v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 668-69 (La. 1923).
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. H§ 31:21 to 31:23 (2007).
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will be extinguished by prescription of nonuse if it ever goes unused
for a ten-year period."
A mineral servitude owner generally has a right to reasonable use
of the surface for the purpose of exercising his servitude rights to explore for or produce minerals. The servitude owner generally does
not need the landowner's permission to enter the property, but common courtesy suggests that a servitude owner generally should give
the landowner notice before he enters the property.
Under certain circumstances, legal notice will now be required. Act
795 enacts Louisiana Revised Statute 30:28(I), which requires that operators give notice to landowners at least thirty days prior to entering
their land to drill.5 4 The legislation does not require notice if the operator has a contract with the landowner, the operator is entering the
property only for pre-drilling activities (such as surveying), or the operator is drilling an additional well from an existing well pad and the
operator is not expanding the pad or the access road to the pad. 5 For
purposes of the pre-entry notice requirement, "surface owner" is defined as the person or persons shown as the owner on the rolls of the
local property assessor. 6
The Commissioner may grant a waiver of the thirty-day notice if
waiting thirty days to enter the land would result in termination of a
lease." The Commissioner may also waive the thirty-day requirement
in emergency circumstances.58
V. LANDMEN AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAw ALLEGATIONS

In Collins v. Godchaux, Collins was a landman who contracted to

manage the mineral interests of two landowners in return for a specified portion of any mineral revenue they received." After the landowners entered a settlement that resulted in an existing lease being
amended and five new leases being executed, Collins and the landowners disagreed about Collins's right to a portion of the revenue the
60
landowners received from the new leases and the amended lease.
6
Collins brought suit for the money he believed he was owed. ' The
landowners filed a counterclaim, asserting that the work performed by
Collins constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and therefore
52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27 (2007).

53. §§ 31:21, 31:23.
54. Drilling Permits, No. 795, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 795 (West) (enacting LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(I) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.)).
55. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(I)(1)(c), (e)-(f) (codified at § 30:28(I)(1)(c), (e)-(f)).
56. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(I)(2) (codified at § 30:28(I)(2)).
57. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(I)(1)(d) (codified at § 30:28(I)(1)(d)).
58. Id.
59. Collins v. Godchaux, 86 So. 3d 831, 832 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
60. Id. at 833.
61. Id.
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they were entitled to a cancellation of their contract with Collins, as
well as a reimbursement of the money they had already paid him.62
In support of their counterclaim, the landowners noted that Collins
had negotiated contracts on their behalf. 3 They also alleged that he
had advised them about their legal rights." The district court
agreed." It held that Collins had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and that his contract with the landowners was void.66 But
the court held that the landowners' "unclean hands" barred their recovery of the money they already had paid to Collins."
The Louisiana Third Circuit concluded that Collins had not given
legal advice.68 Further, the Third Circuit concluded, citing to prior
Louisiana Supreme Court opinions, that tasks which historically have
been performed by landmen do not constitute the "unauthorized practice of law," even if some of those tasks appear to fit within Louisiana's statutory definition of that phrase.6 9 Because the tasks
performed by Collins were the types of tasks traditionally performed
by landmen, he had not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 70
VI.

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
FLUID COMPOSITION
A.

Regulation Mandating Disclosure

As reported in Texas Wesleyan's 2011 Oil & Gas Survey, the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") proposed a new regulation that would require operators to disclose information about the
water used in hydraulic fracturing. 7 The regulation, which went into
effect on October 20, 2011, requires operators to disclose on a well-bywell basis:
* the volume of hydraulic fracturing fluid used;
* the types of additives used (for example, biocides, corrosion inhibitors, friction reducers, etc.), as well as the volume of each type;
* the trade name and supplier of each additive; and
* a list of any chemical compounds contained in the additives that qualify as hazardous under certain federal regu62. Id. at 834.
63. Id. at 835.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 834.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 839.
69. Id. at 838-39; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:212(A)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2012) (defining
"unauthorized practice of law").
70. Collins, 86 So. 3d at 838-39.
71. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118 (2011).
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/14
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lations, along with the maximum concentration of each
compound.
The new regulation, found at Louisiana Administrative Code
43.XIX.118, requires that the operator either include this information
with the Well History Report, which must be filed with the Office of
Conservation within twenty days after completion of the well, or submit a statement that the information is posted on the FracFocus website that is operated by the Groundwater Protection Council. If the
identity of the chemical compound is a trade secret, the operator is
excused from identifying the compound but is required to identify the
chemical family to which the compound belongs.74
B.

Statute Mandating Regulation

The legislature enacted Act 812, which directs the Office to draft
regulations for mandatory disclosure of hydraulic fracturing fluid
composition-something that the Office had done even before Act
812 was passed.75 The statute mandates that the regulations require
disclosure within twenty days after completion of the hydraulic fracturing operations, whereas the existing regulations require disclosure
within twenty days of completion of the well.7" Otherwise, Act 812
appears to mandate regulatory requirements consistent with the existing regulations in Louisiana Administrative Code 43.XIX.118.7

VII. AcouisrrIoN

OF PROPERTY FOR PIPELINES BY

EMINENT DOMAIN
Federal statutes and the statutes of many states provide procedures
for private companies to acquire property by eminent domain for certain purposes, such as the construction of natural gas pipelines. The
owners from whom such property is acquired are entitled to compensation, but the process can proceed very quickly, and property owners
generally cannot block an acquisition. The process is called "condem-

72. Id.
73. Id.; see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 105 (2011) (setting the twentyday deadline for filing the Well History Report).
74. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118.
75. Hydraulic Fracturing, No. 812, 2012 La. Sess. Law. Serv. 812 (West) [hereinafter Hydraulic Fracturing, No. 8121; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118.
76. Compare LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118, with Hydraulic Fracturing,
No. 812.
77. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118.
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nation" under federal law78 and the law of many states,7 9 but typically
is called "expropriation" in Louisiana. 0
During its 2012 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted
Act 702, which was signed into law by Governor Jindal.8 1 The Act
amends existing statutes regarding expropriation, including Louisiana
Revised Statutes 19:2 and 19:2.2.82 The amendments leave the power
of expropriation intact and attempt to ensure that the process of expropriation can still proceed relatively quickly, but the amendments
also take modest steps to protect landowners from unfairness in the
process.83
For example, prior law allowed a company that had the power of
expropriation (an "expropriating authority") to file a petition for expropriation whenever "a price cannot be agreed upon with the
owner." Prior law did not require the expropriating authority to negotiate with the landowner in good faith in an attempt to reach an
agreement with the landowner without resort to an expropriation action." Act 702 requires a company to make a "good faith" attempt to
reach an agreement with a property owner regarding compensation
prior to filing an expropriation action.8 6 In those negotiations, the
company must offer compensation at least equal to the lowest appraised value of the property or property rights to be acquired.87
Prior law did not require an expropriating authority to give a landowner a reasonable period to consider the authority's offer to
purchase the property." Act 702 provides that, at least thirty days
before filing an expropriation action, the expropriating authority must
send a letter to the property owner by certified mail, stating (1) the
legal basis by which the company could exercise expropriation authority; (2) the purpose and conditions of the proposed acquisition of
property; and (3) the compensation the company proposes to pay.89
With the letter, the authority also must include a copy of all appraisals
that the company has obtained of the property to be acquired; a plat
78. See, e.g., Mars. & Ne. Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Deccoulas, 146 F. App'x 495, 496 (1st
Cir. 2005); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006).
79. See, e.g., TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(c)(7)(a) (West 2008 & Supp.
2012); Tex. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.051 (Supp. 2012).
80. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:2 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).
81. Press Release, La. Office of the Governor, Governor Jindal Signs Bills and
Issues Vetoes (June 15, 2012), http://www.gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom
&tmp=detail&articlelD=3480.
82. See Expropriation, No. 702, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 702 (West).
83. See id.
84. § 19:2.
85. See id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:2.2 (West, Westlaw current through
2012 Reg. Sess.).
86. See Expropriation, No. 702.
87. See id.
88. See § 19:2; see also § 19:2.2.
89. Expropriation, No. 702.
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showing the boundaries of the proposed acquisition; a description of
any proposed above-ground facilities that the company proposes to
place on the property and the location where the facilities will be located; and a statement of the "considerations for the proposed route
or area to be acquired.""
VIII.

CONTAMINATION LITIGATION (A/K/A "LEGACY LITIGATION")

Since the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Corbello v. Iowa
Production," plaintiffs have filed a large number of "legacy litigation"
actions, asserting that their property was contaminated by past oil and
gas activity.'
As the number of those suits began to multiply, people began to
express concern that plaintiffs could receive large money judgments
that were based on the estimated cost of remediating property, but
that plaintiffs were not required to spend the money on remediation."
Thus, the contamination might remain a threat to the environment.
And, if a plaintiff failed to use a money judgment to clean-up his
property, a company that already had paid that judgment might face
the possibility of having to pay again-this time, for a clean-up ordered by regulators.9 4 Another concern was that plaintiffs' experts
and defendants' experts often expressed very different opinions about
what type of clean-up was appropriate, and jurors and judges who
lacked expertise in environmental science were being called upon to
choose between such competing testimony.
In its 2006 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act
312, which addresses these two concerns.95 It established a process by
which the Louisiana Office of Conservation would hold hearings and
issue its opinion regarding what clean-up was appropriate. 6 Al90. Id.

91. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
92. In Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.1 (La. 2010), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "Legacy litigation" refers to hundreds of cases filed by
landowners seeking damages from oil and gas exploration companies for alleged environmental damage in the wake of this Court's decision in Corbello v. Iowa Production. These types of actions are known as "legacy litigation" because they often arise
from operations conducted many decades ago, leaving an unwanted "legacy" in the
form of actual or alleged contamination. See Loulan Pitre, Jr., "Legacy Litigation"
and Acts 312 of 2006, 20 TuL. ENVrL. L.J. 347, 347-49 (2007).

93. In her concurring opinion in M.J Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Justice
Johnson noted that the legislature's intent in enacting "Act 312" was to require that
damages awards be spent on clean-up. 998 So. 2d 16, 39 (La. 2008) (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
94. Although the concern about double exposure heightened after the number of
legacy litigation cases increased, the concern had been expressed earlier, such as in
the concurring opinion of Justice Lemmon in Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil
Co., 576 So. 2d 475, 486 (La. 1991) (Lemmon, J., concurring).
95. Remediation, No. 312, 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 312 (West) (codified at LA.
REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 30:29 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.)).

96. Id.
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though parties could offer their own remediation plans, the Office of
Conservation's plan might provide some guidance to the judge or
jury.9" Second, assuming a defendant was found liable and that it paid
a money judgment, the money would have to be spent on clean-up.98
But a number of other issues remained unresolved, some of which
were spawned by Act 312 itself.
A. Act 779-Reforms Relating to Procedure and
Admissions of Liability
During its 2012 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature adopted
two bills to address legacy litigation issues.99 One of the issues addressed by the legislation was one that sometimes has been disputed
by parties in legacy litigation-whether a party has the right to subpoena employees of the Office of Conservation or Department of
Natural Resources in order to compel testimony about their work in
helping the Office devise a recommendation for a remediation plan.100
Act 779 enacts a new section of Louisiana Revised Statute 30:29 that
authorizes parties in legacy litigation to subpoena any Office "employee, contractor, or representative" for testimony at a deposition or
trial if that person was involved in formulating the remediation plan
recommended by the Office.10'
Another issue of controversy is the large number of defendants
named in legacy lawsuits. Plaintiffs often name many-sometimes
dozens-companies and individuals as defendants in legacy litigation,1o and in some cases, the plaintiffs may not have evidence to link
some of the defendants to the alleged contamination. Act 779 establishes a procedure whereby a defendant may request a hearing at
which the plaintiff has the initial burden of introducing evidence of
environmental damages. 03 If the plaintiff introduces such evidence,
the defendant has the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant is legally responsible for the contamination.'on
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites,
No. 779, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 779 (West); Liability for Environmental Damage,
No. 754, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 754 (West).
100. See, e.g., Tensas Poppadoc, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 49 So. 3d 1020,
1024-26 (La. 2010), writ granted and case remanded, 58 So. 3d 473 (La. 2011).
101. See Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites,
No. 779 (amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.)).
102. For example, the plaintiffs named "[alpproximately 25 defendants." M.J.
Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 20 n.2 (La. 1991).
103. Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites, No.
779.
104. See id.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/14
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If a defendant establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, the court must dismiss that defendant without prejudice.o" If
another party later discovers evidence that the dismissed defendant
may have liability, the party may cause the dismissed defendant to be
rejoined to the litigation.'0 If the dismissed defendant is never rejoined, the defendant is entitled to a dismissal with prejudice when the
litigation ends in a final, non-appealable judgment.10
Louisiana has a relatively short limitations period for tort claimsone year. 10 8 Although the running of the limitations period may be
suspended by the discovery rule, Louisiana jurisprudence provides
that the limitations period begins to run as soon as a plaintiff knows
facts that would cause a reasonable person to inquire about potential
harm, even if the plaintiff does not yet have facts sufficient to point to
a particular defendant.' 09 Act 779 provides running of the limitations
period is suspended for one year if a person who suspects his property
is contaminated submits to the Office of Conservation a "notice of
intent to investigate" that meets certain requirements.11 0
Act 779 also contains other provisions. For example, the Act prohibits parties from engaging in ex parte communications with the Office of Conservation during the time that the Office is considering
proposed remediation plans."' The Act authorizes the Office to issue
compliance orders for remediation after a person admits liability or is
found liable for contamination.'1 2 Finally, if a party admits liability,
the Act requires that party to waive any contractual indemnification
rights it might have for any punitive damages arising from the
contamination." 3

105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2011) (one-year prescriptive period for
delictual actions); see also LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3493 (2011). A "delictual action"
is a tort action. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290
F.3d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 2002). In Louisiana, limitations periods that correspond to
what many jurisdictions would call a "statute of limitations" are called a period of
"liberative prescription." See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2007).
109. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 245-46 (La. 2010). Under Louisiana jurisprudence, the "discovery rule" is one of four categories of contra non
valentem, a doctrine which can suspend the running of liberative prescription. Id.
110. See Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites,
No. 779.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Act 754-Additional Provisions Relating to Procedure and
Admissions of Liability

The other legislation relating to legacy litigation was Act 754, which
enacts Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1552 and 1563.114
Parties in legacy litigation sometimes have disputes regarding testing
and inspection of allegedly contaminated property. Act 754 permits
any party, or the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
("LDNR"), to request that the court direct attorneys for the parties in
legacy litigation to appear before LDNR to develop an environmental
management order that authorizes all parties to have access to the
property for inspection and testing and establishes time periods and
protocols for testing and inspection."s Such an order must provide
that any test results must be disclosed to all parties and LDNR within
thirty days."' If the test results are not disclosed, the party that failed
to disclose the results is barred from offering the results into
evidence.' 17
Another issue has been whether defendants could pay for a
remediation or admit liability for contamination without admitting liability for other damages claimed by plaintiffs. Act 754 permits defendants to admit responsibility for implementing a plan to evaluate,
and if necessary, remediate all or a portion of any contamination without admitting liability for other alleged damages. 1 8 Once a party admits liability for remediation, the matter is referred to LDNR for a
public hearing on the most feasible plan for a remediation.xx,
C. Subsequent PurchaserDoctrine
When a person purchases property that contains contamination that
is not readily apparent, and the seller does not expressly assign to the
buyer any claims against third parties for damages arising from the
contamination, Does the buyer have a cause of action against third
parties? Under the "subsequent purchaser doctrine," the cause of action against third parties would remain with the seller, and the buyer
would not have such a cause of action. Until recently, it was unclear
whether the subsequent purchaser doctrine applies under Louisiana

law.120

114. Liability for Environmental Damage, No. 754, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 754
(West) (amending LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1552, 1563).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 256 n.18 (La. 2010). The
Court noted that it had granted review in part to address whether the subsequent
purchaser doctrine applies under Louisiana law, but that the court ultimately had not
reached the issue because it had resolved the case on other grounds. Id.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/14
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In Eagle Pipe & Supply Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., the Louisiana
Supreme Court resolved the question, at least with respect to tort
claims, by holding that the subsequent purchaser doctrine applies. 12 1
In Eagle Pipe, the plaintiff purchased land that previously had been
used for the removal of scale from the interior of oilfield piping. 1 2 2
Such scale sometimes contains naturally occurring radioactive material ("NORM") that originates from the formations from which oil or
gas is produced. Subsequent to the purchase, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality performed an inspection and discovered the land was contaminated with NORM. 123 The contamination
had not been readily apparent. 124
The plaintiff brought a claim against the seller.12 5 The plaintiff also
brought claims against various trucking companies that allegedly had
transported pipes to the site and against several oil and gas companies
that allegedly owned the pipes that were cleaned at the site.126 The
Court held that a cause of action for contamination generally belongs
to the person who owned the land at the time of contamination, and,
absent an assignment of the cause of action, a subsequent purchaser
has no right of action against third parties, such as the trucking companies and oil and gas companies that might have fault for the contamination. 12 The Court expressly noted, however, that it was not
expressing an opinion on whether a similar result would apply in a
case involving defendants that were parties to a mineral lease relating
to the contaminated land."
D.

Extent of Remediation Damages

In Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., the State of
Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed three lawsuits,
seeking remediation of certain public properties that the plaintiffs alleged had been contaminated by the oil and gas activity of UNOCAL
and other defendants. 1 29 UNOCAL admitted responsibility. UNOCAL then filed a motion for a partial summary judgment, stating that
Act 312 limited its liability to the amount of money needed to fund a
"feasible plan" approved by the court pursuant to Louisiana Revised
121. Eagle Pipe & Supply Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011).
122. Id. at 253-54.
123. Id. at 254.
124. Id. at 257.
125. Id. at 253.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 283.
128. See id. at 281 n.80.
129. See Louisiana v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 85 So. 3d 158 (La. Ct. App.),
writ granted, 92 So. 3d 340 (La. 2012).
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Statute 30:29.130 The court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs
appealed. 31
The Third Circuit examined the language of Revised Statute 30:29,
including 30:29(H), which states in part:
This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a
judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suffered as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise provided in this Section. Nor shall it preclude a judgment ordering
damages for or implementation of additional remediation in excess
of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to
this Section as may be required in accordance with the terms of an
express contractual provision.1 32
The "plan adopted by the court" refers to a plan to remediate the
property to regulatory standards.
Some readers of the statute might conclude that, because the statute
expressly allows claims for remediation in excess of the regulatory
standard whenever a more rigorous remediation is "required [by] an
express contractual provision," the statute implies that claims for a
more rigorous remediation are not allowed in the absence of an express contractual provision. The Third Circuit concluded, however,
that the statute should be interpreted otherwise. 3 3 The Third Circuit
stated that, "La. R.S. 30:29, by its clear language, provides for a landowner to recover damages in excess of those determined in the feasible plan whether they be based on tort or contract law."1 3 The Third
Circuit therefore reversed the trial court's judgment that the defendants' liability was limited to funding the "feasible plan" approved by
the court pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 30:29.135
The Louisiana Supreme Court has agreed to review the Third Circuit's ruling.13 1
IX. SECTION 16 MINERAL RIGHTS
"Section 16" lands are certain lands formerly owned by the federal
government that the United States has transferred to the states for the
purpose of supporting public schools.'
In Louisiana, the state has
retained ownership of Section 16 land,'13 but a Louisiana statute provides that each parish school board has the right, in its own name, to
grant mineral leases covering any such lands within the school board's
130. Id. at 159.
131. Id. at 160.
132. Id. at 161-62.
133. Id. at 162-63.
134. Id. at 162.
135. Id.
136. Louisiana v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 92 So. 3d 340 (La. 2012).
137. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234, 1237-38 (La.
Ct. App. 2012).
138. See id. at 1238.
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parish.' 9 Further, a school board has the right to keep all revenue

from such leases.14 0
In late 2005 and early 2006, the Vermilion Parish School Board
("VPSB") brought three related actions, asserting that various defendants had underpaid it for royalties owed on mineral leases VPSB
had granted for Section 16 lands.' 4 1 The alleged underpayments related to oil produced during the early 1990s, more than ten years
before VPSB filed suit.14 2 This led to a potential timeliness issue because the general limitations period for royalty claims in Louisiana is
three years. 43
Further, for several years, VPSB had been aware of facts that would
make it difficult for VPSB to reasonably assert that the running of the
limitations period had been suspended by the discovery rule-indeed,
VPSB eventually stipulated in each of the three cases that the discovery rule would not apply and that its royalty claims were time-barred
unless the claims were immune from "liberative prescription,"1 4 4 the
equivalent of a statute of limitations.145 The defendants asserted that
the claims were not immune from prescription because, although the
state itself is immune from prescription, that immunity does not extend to local government or political subdivisions, such as school
boards.146 Each of the three cases was before a different district court
judge, and each dismissed the VPSB's claims, holding that the claims
were not immune from prescription and that the claims therefore

were time-barred.14 7
On appeal, VPSB did not assert that it was entitled to immunity
from prescription in its own right.148 VPSB argued, however, that it
139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:152 (2007).
140. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:154 (Supp. 2012).
141. See ConocoPhillips,83 So. 3d at 1236. The Author of this Article was lead
counsel for ConocoPhillips Co., the primary defendant in one of the three cases, and
was lead counsel for Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. in one of the other two related cases.
142. Id.
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3494 (2011).
144. The fact is not readily apparent from the Louisiana Third Circuit's opinion;
but it is stated in a brief filed by ConocoPhillips, and is not disputed in either the
Board's original brief or reply brief. Compare Brief for Appellee at 1, Vermilion
Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (2012) (No. 11-009999-CA),
2011 WL 5117380, with Brief for Appellant at 6, Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (2011) (No. 11-00999-CA), 2011 WL 4826847, and
Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83
So. 3d 1234 (2011) (No. 11-00999-CA), 2011 WL 5563588.
145. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2011).
146. La. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Pineville, 403 So. 2d 49, 53 (La. 1981).
147. ConocoPhillips,83 So. 3d at 1234 (Judge Everett); Id. at 1236 (dismissal of all
three cases based on prescription); Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
83 So. 3d 1242, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (Judge Trahan); Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v.
UNOCAL Corp., 83 So. 3d 1242, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (Judge Duplantier).
148. On appeal, the parties' briefing narrowed the issues relating to the VPSB's
assertion that it was immune from prescription. See Brief for Appellee at 1, Vermil-
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was not asserting claims on behalf of itself.14 9 VPSB argued that the
statute that gives school boards the authority to grant mineral leases
in their own names for Section 16 lands does not grant executive
rights to school boards. 5 0 Instead, it merely makes school boards the
leasing agents for the state.15 1 Moreover, argued V PSB, the statute
that gives school boards the right to keep all revenue from Section 16
mineral leases does not grant certain mineral rights to school
boards.1" 2 Instead, it appropriates certain money-the state's Section
16 mineral lease revenue-to school boards. 5 Thus, argued VPSB,
the royalty claims asserted by VPSB were royalty claims that belonged to the state, not VPSB, and VPSB was asserting claims on behalf of the state.15 4 The Louisiana Third Circuit agreed, holding that
the royalty claims were immune from prescription.1 55 The appellate
court therefore reversed the dismissals of each of the three cases and
remanded for further proceedings.15 6
X.

CLAIMS BY UNLEASED OWNERS

In Wells v. Zadeck, an unleased mineral rights owner brought a
claim for proceeds from production that were owed to him, but which
had never been paid to him.1s7 The parties disputed the timeliness of
the plaintiff's claim." In resolving the issues before it, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that a claim by an unleased owner is a quasicontractual claim that is governed by the ten-year prescriptive period
established by Civil Code article 3499, rather than the three-year prescriptive period established for royalty claims by Civil Code article
3494.159

ion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (2012) (No. 11-009999-CA),
2011 WL 5117380. For example, Civil Code article 3494, the provision that imposes a
three-year limitations period for royalty claims, states that the article does not apply
to royalty claims derived from "state owned property." One might think that the
provision might help VPSB given that the state owns Section 16 lands. But the defendants argued that lease royalties derive from ownership of mineral rights, not from
mere ownership of land, and that the phrase "state owned property" means state
owned mineral rights, not state owned land. By the time the cases were on appeal,
VPSB was not seriously contesting the defendants' reading of Civil Code article 3494.
149. ConocoPhillips,83 So. 3d at 1241.
150. Id. at 1237.
151. Id. at 1240.
152. Id. at 1239.
153. Id. at 1240.
154. Id. at 1237.
155. Id. at 1241.
156. Id.; Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 83 So. 3d 1242, 1242
(La. Ct. App. 2012); Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. UNOCAL Corp., 83 So. 3d 1242,
1242 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
157. Wells v. Zadeck, 89 So. 3d 1145, 1146 (La. 2012).
158. Id. at 1146-50.
159. Id.
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